We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Schelling [Schelling, T., 1969. Models of segregation. American Economic Review 59, 488-493; Schelling, T., 1971a. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1, 143-186; Schelling, T., 1971b. On the ecology of micromotives. The Public Interest 25, 61-98; Schelling, T., 1978....

Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).