Purpose: In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we...

This paper makes the case that nonrivalness and nonexcludability properties of public goods are still relevant and crucial considerations. Although these characteristics of publicness may be socially endogenous with institutional choice, these properties are not necessarily determined by this...

If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the...

type="main" xml:id="ecca12074-abs-0001" <p>Experience from climate policy suggests that full cooperation among all countries is not a likely outcome. In this paper we therefore consider the case where only members of a subgroup of countries cooperate by reciprocally matching their public good...</p>