We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate segmentations by finance-related attitudes and behavior of financial consumers in Switzerland and Vietnam. Design/methodology/approach: The authors replicated the questionnaire measuring attitudes toward financial affairs as used in the study...

In this paper, we first show that for classical rational investors with correct beliefs and constant absolute or constant relative risk aversion, the utility gains from structured products over and above a portfolio consisting of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio are typically much...

We demonstrate that in simple 2×2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be (semi-)evolutionarily stable, in particular, a population of players with prospect theory preferences is stable against more rational players, i.e. players with a smaller degree of probability weighting. We...