We examine explicitly priced financial distress risk in post-1990 equity markets. We add a financial distress risk factor to Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, based on Griffin and Lemmon's (2002) findings that financial distress is not fully captured by the book-to-market factor. We...

It is fundamental to good governance that corporate decision makers be well informed, have the knowledge-base necessary to use the information effectively, and share the same motivations as the owners. Further, managers must provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the...

We examine the empirical relationship between direct equity agency costs measures and corporate governance control mechanisms to control equity agency costs. We measure the three direct agency cost proxies commonly used in the literature: the operating expense; asset turnover; and selling,...

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's...

The premise of this discussion is that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business platform. This intended maximization occurs when the current value of the exercise instrument equals the...

Lai, Li, Conover, and Wu (2010) propose a four-factor financial distress model to explain stock returns in the U.S. and Japanese markets. We examine this model in the stock markets of Australia, and six Asian markets (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). We find broad...