Let X be a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space, let U⊂X be open with U¯ compact, let F:U¯→X be an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence with no fixed points in U¯∖U, let P be a compact absolute neighborhood retract, and let ρ:U¯→P be a continuous...

In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine...

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposerʼs identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if...

A decision scheme (Gibbard, 1977) maps profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. A decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent...