Stable networks of order r where r is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional deviation of size r or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relation with efficient networks under anonymous and component additive value...

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both...

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of collaboration networks in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We then present some results on efficient...

Private peering refers to settlement-free connectivity agreements between Internet Service Providers meant to interconnect their networks by-passing congested National Access Points. We explore the incentives for bilateral peering with particular emphasis on traffic diversion. A private peering...

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of two Internet service providers (ISPs), drawn from a larger set consisting of Tiers-1 and -2 ISPs, who choose between peering and transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of interconnection taking into account traffic imbalances. The...

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability.