We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive...

Il saggio propone alcune riflessioni sulle culture politiche, giuridiche e sociologiche vicine al pensiero delle numerose e ostinate ricerche militanti di Bruno Trentin. Non si tratta di "saggiare" l’indiscutibile attualità dell’imponente corpus teorico trentiniano, quanto di partire dalle...

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two...