This paper considers the problem of an agent's choice under uncertainty in a new framework. The agent does not know the true probability distribution over the state space but is objectively informed that it belongs to a specified set of probabilities. Maintaining the hypothesis that this agent...

We study how matchmakers use prices to sort heterogeneous participants into competing matching markets and how equilibrium outcomes compare with monopoly in terms of prices, matching market structure, and sorting efficiency under the assumption of complementarity in the match value function. The...

This paper considers the problem of an agent's choice under uncertainty in a new framework. The agent does not know the true probability distribution over the state space but is objectively informed that it belongs to a specified set of probabilities. Maintaining the hypothesis that this agent...

Two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking. The peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in...

We consider a two-sided, finite-horizon search and matching model with heterogeneous types and complementarity between types. The quality of the pool of potential partners deteriorates as agents who have found mutually agreeable matches exit the market. When search is costless and all agents...