Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to...

We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the...

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the...

Using the work in experimentation, the author endogenizes the, until now, exogenous information in information sharing models. He finds that agreements to exchange information affect the value and production of information. With unknown cost, a learning-by-doing like effect also arises. These...

Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity-setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non-merging firms (outsiders). We...

A monopoly facing potential entry may not want to develop an efficient technology even at zero R&D costs. Such a phenomenon occurs if a new technology is distinct from the existing one so production uncertainty becomes technology-specific. Then the monopoly can reduce the entrant's post-entry...