This study focuses on the question of neural differences in the evaluation of hypothetical and real payoffs. Hypothetical payoffs are not incentive compatible and are, therefore, not considered to be reliable. Behavioral differences between the evaluation of hypothetical and real payoffs can be...

While experimental research on social dilemmas focuses on the distribution of gains, we analyze social preferences in the case of losses. In this experimental study, the participants share a loss in a Nash bargaining game, but waiting time, instead of monetary losses, serves as an incentive....

Power law distributions are very common in natural sciences. We analyze high frequency financial data from XETRA and the NYSE using maximum likelihood estimation and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic to test whether the power law hypothesis holds also for these data. We find that the...

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the risk attitude of the participant failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...

Each of several exchange partners owns a specific commodity which she can share with others. Unlike in other social dilemma scenarios like prisoners' dilemma, public goods games, etc., voluntary cooperation relies on bilateral exchanges whose profitabilities are interdependent. How will mutual...

In an experimental setting, subjects face a standard elicitation task for certainty equivalents. We show that when a third, objectively irrelevant, option is added to the standard task, the willingness to take risks increases.

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...