Each of several exchange partners owns a specific commodity which she can share with others. Unlike in other social dilemma scenarios like prisoners' dilemma, public goods games, etc., voluntary cooperation relies on bilateral exchanges whose profitabilities are interdependent. How will mutual...

Can any prominent theory of decision under risk rationalize both small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion? Do some prominent theories fail to rationalize patterns of same-stakes risk aversion? How do reference payoffs enter in the answer to these questions? What would be the...

In an experimental setting, subjects face a standard elicitation task for certainty equivalents. We show that when a third, objectively irrelevant, option is added to the standard task, the willingness to take risks increases.

Power law distributions are very common in natural sciences. We analyze high frequency financial data from XETRA and the NYSE using maximum likelihood estimation and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic to test whether the power law hypothesis holds also for these data. We find that the...

Using an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy as a basis, we argue that a monetary system can be more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedback of his...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...