Showing 1 - 10 of 59
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012672080
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415645
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- List of Contributors -- Chapter one. Introduction / Diamond, Peter / Vartiainen, Hannu -- Chapter two. Behavioral Public Economics:Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard Decision-Makers / Bernheim, B. Douglas / Rangel, Antonio -- Chapter three....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014482558
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545608
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013186770
We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589101
We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153541
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005158961
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673954