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KIKUTA, KENSAKU - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 09 (2007) 02, pp. 285-306

We define a duality of solutions in coalitional games that we call a twisted duality. This twisted duality extends the rule of self-duality in bankruptcy problems. After showing that the prekernel and prenucleolus exhibit twisted duality, we define a twisted reduced game property and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081038

STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

FUNAKI, YUKIHIKO; YAMATO, TAKEHIKO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 03, pp. 1450006-1

formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral … sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765576

COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

BENCHEKROUN, HASSAN; LONG, NGO VAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 14 (2012) 04, pp. 1240002-1

the various concepts of coalitional stability, such as internal and external stability and far-sighted stability in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883245

MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY

BIRÓ, PÉTER; KLIJN, FLIP - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340008-1

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011309

DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES

MEERTENS, MARC; POTTERS, JOS; REIJNIERSE, HANS - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 03, pp. 395-416

This paper investigates a class of dynamic selection processes for n-person normal-form games which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. For (two-person) zero-sum games and for (n-person) potential games every limit set of these dynamics is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081052

COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY

HAJDUKOVÁ, JANA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 04, pp. 613-641

quality of a coalition structure is evaluated according to its stability. We review various definitions of stability and … restrictions of preferences ensuring the existence of a partition stable with respect to a particular stability definition. Further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081059

EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED

KLAUS, BETTINA; KLIJN, FLIP - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (2009) 02, pp. 181-198

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s (1999) analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in terms of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493092

Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 17 (2015) 01, pp. 1540006-1

producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies — efficient and inefficient. We examine stability … equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition …, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279154

VERTICAL FORECLOSURE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE LONG RUN: FULL INTERCONNECTION QUALITY FORECLOSURE X SLEEPING PATENTS

MATTOS, CÉSAR - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 09 (2007) 03, pp. 527-549

No abstract received.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970214

INTRODUCTION TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

BREITNER, MICHAEL H. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 03, pp. 241-243

No abstract received.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970215