Twenty-four laboratory sessions were conducted to evaluate the roles of communication and group heterogeneity when voluntary contributions determine the level of public good provision by small groups of individuals. Simple heterogeneity has one individual in a group having either greater...

This paper presents the results of a revealed-choice experiment testing the theoretical predictions of political economy models regarding public support for a publicly provided private good financed with proportional income taxes when individuals can purchase the good privately and either...

In a laboratory-controlled environment we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency (complete over incomplete information) and empowerment on trust and trustworthiness. We implement a simple version of the standard two-person investment game in a repeated game context with...

The social preference of corrective taxation to corrective subsidy or to a policy of no action at all is examined within the context of a simple general general equilibrium framework in which an external production diseconomy exists. Equilibrium positions are obtained for a number of different...

This paper uses a controlled laboratory environment and a two-person investment game in a multi-period setting to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution on trust and trustworthiness. Two forms of vetoes are tested: the first is...

Increasing attention is being paid to emission trading programs for the control of air and water pollution. The United States EPA has implemented a tradable emission allowance program for sulphur oxides. The EPA auction has been investigated in the laboratory by Cronshaw and Brown Kruse and by...