We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors...

We study the long-run emergence of behavioral patterns in dynamic complex networks. Individuals can display two kinds of behavior: G ("good" ) or B ("bad" ). We assume that the exposure of a G agent to bad behavior on the part of peers/neighbors triggers her own switch to B behavior, but only...

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös–Rényi networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a social network....

We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of “structurally similar” games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by learning from past behavior of others and then best respond to these beliefs looking k periods ahead. We...

This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A...