We provide an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value in TU games as the unique maximizer of expected Nash welfare. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Tijs et al. (2006) introduce the family of obligation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. We prove that obligation rules are closely related with the marginalistic values of the irreducible game. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of obligation rules with two basic...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not...

We extend the literature on the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value, by identifying a class of coalitional form games called PS games. We analyse the role of PS games in the context of queueing problems, and show that in the class of generalized queueing games only those...