In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.

In the case of persistent dumping, welfare effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the existing international trade theory cannot provide a clear rationale for policies to prohibit international price discrimination. Through a two-stage game on the endogenous foreign monopolist's dumping decision,...

The price premium of generic pharmaceuticals to brand-names is examined under different competitive market situations. The result of this study shows that the number, market share, and the age of both brand-name and generic products have the most explanatory power for explaining the price...

The objective of this paper is to provide two-stage game models explaining the 'Generic Competition Paradox' that demonstrates an increase of brand-name drug price in response to generic entry. Under the assumption that there are two groups of consumers who are segmented by their insurance...