We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of ɛ=sk 7/1 the ɛ-core...

The lexicographic kernel of a game lexicographically maximizes the surplusses s ij (rather than the excesses as would the nucleolus) and is contained in both the least core and the kernel. We show that an element in the lexicographic kernel can be computed efficiently, provided we can...

We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of ɛ=sk<Subscript>7/1</Subscript> the ɛ-core...</subscript>

The lexicographic kernel of a game lexicographically maximizes the surplusses s <Subscript> ij </Subscript> (rather than the excesses as would the nucleolus) and is contained in both the least core and the kernel. We show that an element in the lexicographic kernel can be computed efficiently, provided we can...</subscript>

Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper introduces a new class of games, highway games, which arise from situations where there is a common resource that agents will jointly use. That resource is an ordered set of several indivisible sections, where each section has an associated fixed cost and each agent requires some...