We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pin down relative bidding postures, but we show that by adding small amounts of private value information, a unique equilibrium can be...

We study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality-cost differentiated firms. Strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise. In equilibrium, only the top two firms advertise, earning “Bertrand-like" profits. Welfare losses initially rise then...

We endogenize product design in a model of sequential search with random firm-consumer match value à la Wolinsky (Quart J Econ 96:493–511, <CitationRef CitationID="CR21">1986</CitationRef>) and Anderson and Renault (RAND J Econ 30:719–735, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1999</CitationRef>). We focus on a product design choice by which a firm can control the dispersion of...</citationref></citationref>

Bidders often face avoidable fixed costs or other synergies that can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or a preference to avoid volatility, then equilibrium predictions...