The ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator cannot observe individual emissions, or when monitoring costs are prohibitive. While this view is supported to a large extent by experimental findings, there...

We investigate how increased competition affects firm owners׳ incentives and managers׳ efforts in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers a compensation scheme to his manager in two different conditions: under monopoly and under Cournot duopoly. Following acceptance of the compensation, the...

This paper provides a general framework that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. Each player balances her material utility loss from contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her...

We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983), according to which “when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income". Our experimental design differs from Chan...

We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee...

[fre] Nous présentons dans cet article une évaluation expérimentale d’un mécanisme de prévention de la fraude fiscale proposé par Greenberg (1984 ). L’auteur soutient l’idée de la tolérance d’une partie de fraudeurs dans une population. Pour cela, il conçoit un mécanisme fondé...

[fre] Bien que la France ait écarté jusqu’ici l’idée de recourir à des instruments incitatifs pour réduire la pollution diffuse aux nitrates, cet article revient sur le potentiel de ces instruments tels qu’ils ont été employés par certains de nos voisins européens ou, à défaut,...