This article describes a large number of contestants with high and low levels of talent who individually decide to enter a contest or take their heterogeneous outside options. We derive a critical condition for which only high types, only low types or both types participate in the contest. If a...

type="main" xml:id="sjpe12060-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>This paper analyzes spillover effects in sports leagues that are embedded in a system of promotion and relegation. Based on a contest model of a professional sports league with a top division and a second division, we show that league prizes and...</p>

Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2010. Using a principal-agent model, this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent's and principal's behavior. Specifically, we show how bonus...

Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than...