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This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263593
benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577245
cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582585
Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875
likely when we allow for renegotiation, contrary to standard theories of renegotiation. What appears critical for the success … of collusion with renegotiation is that cheaters are often admonished in strong terms. Allowing renegotiation therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586
The literature on game theory and fisheries is reviewed, beginning with the initial papers from the late 1970s on cooperative and noncooperative games. Later developments considered repeated games and trigger strategies as well as the stability of coalitions. It is argued that the latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603977
We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791
This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263589
, learning, and local optimization have challenged the concept of noncooperative equilibria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024483
This report provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of international regulatory co-operation (IRC) and its potential benefits through reduced trade costs. Different forms of IRC aiming to reduce specification, conformity assessment and information costs - which can arise from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582094