We argue that many strategic interactions are chosen by, rather than imposed upon, agents. The endogeneity of the implicit game substantially alters the incentive structure faced by agents. If agents can refuse to play a game and instead seek a different partner, then it becomes in their...

Laboratory and field experiments have grown significantly in prominence over the past decade. The experimental method provides randomization in key variables therefore permitting a deeper understanding of important economic phenomena. This path-breaking volume provides a valuable collection of...

Recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option, and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game. This paper proposes a behavioral model with two components: a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed...

When prescribers are not price sensitive, prescriptions segment the duopoly market and the unique dominant strategy equilibrium has both firms setting the monopoly price. When some prescribers are price sensitive, manufacturers use mixed strategies but still earn positive expected profit.