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Purpose – Land assembly can mitigate the negative environmental impacts of land fragmentation on urban areas, agriculture, and wildlife. However, the assembler faces several obstacles including transactions costs and the strategic bargaining behavior of landowners. The purpose of this chapter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015380093
Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects' decisions. With...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281256
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This paper develops and experimentally tests a model in which a player’s effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005167092
Conventional wisdom as well as economic theory suggests it is more costly to reassemble fragmented land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Both costs are expected to increase with the number of sellers. Inefficient allocation of land resources may result including property...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871869
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We examine laboratory bargaining experiments with symmetric and asymmetric delay costs and options for proposers to credibly commit to a bargaining position. Contrary to standard game-theoretic predictions, our experimental results suggest that commitment can be used effectively to increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261635
We examine voluntary contributions in a two-stage public good experiment with ‘carryover.’ In two treatments, each subject's second-stage endowment is determined by the return from the public good in the first-stage. We manipulate payoffs across treatments such that, relative to our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576968
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005314830
In a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment, responder behavior is more consistent with game-theoretic predictions when responders indicate a binding minimum acceptable offer (MAO) or when rejection penalizes a "hostage" third player. In general, female subjects indicated higher MAOs but had...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005145459