Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I History -- 1 The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation -- 2 The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution -- 3 Institutions and the Resource Curse in...

We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter. Policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill. We prove existence and necessary conditions of...

We generalize the dynamic bargaining game of Diermeier and Fong (2011) to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non-cooperative characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. Assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences, a pure-strategy stationary...

This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government. Government formation involves...

Across four experiments, participants saw companies as capable of having ‘agentic’ mental states, such as having intentions, but incapable of having ‘experiential’ mental states, such as feeling pain. This difference in mental state ascription caused companies to elicit anger as...

It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto...