Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government‐provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology and illustrative simulations to show how these two types of information problems interact in a way to create...

Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government-provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology and illustrative simulations to show how these two types of information problems interact in a way to create program...

We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems...

In many jurisdictions around the world there occurs a phenomenon that is not only unique but defies a simple explanation. This activity involves the private provision of a public good by individuals, acting in groups, in response to the illegal actions of other individuals. This private...

In this paper, we use a data-set based on a survey of the perceptions about co-existence between Arabs and Jews as held by the inhabitants of five mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel: Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramla. Our main purpose is to determine the relative importance of various factors...