Abstract We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between...

The paper studies the political and economic determinants of inter-regional public transfers. It points to an important difference between two alternative federal fiscal constitutions. The paper shows that inter-regional transfers can be determined either by a federation-wide vote over a...

The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives for, an increase in the inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: Swedish data from 1994 suggests an annual real flow of 3–4% of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100% of GDP. These gains would have arisen mainly...

This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy-making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three...

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the...

A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests...