Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given...

We investigate theoretically and experimentally the <italic>crisis bargaining</italic> model, a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games.Within the...

In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use "Mousetracking" to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, in games of private information with...

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 x 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.

To understand the thinking process in private information games, we use “Mousetracking†to record which payoffs subjects attend to. The games have three information states and vary in strategic complexity. Subjects consistently deviate from Nash equilibrium choices and often fail to...