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We develop a dynamic model of a market with two specialized sides: traders posting quotes ("market makers") and traders hitting quotes ("market takers"). Traders monitor the market to seize profit opportunities, generating high frequency liquidity cycles. Monitoring decisions by market-makers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558587
We develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liquidity traders of varying impatience. In equilibrium, patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatient traders submit market orders. Two variables are the key determinants of the limit order book dynamics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005743908
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We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders. These traders must trade, yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision. Traders differ in their impatience: less patient traders demand liquidity, more patient traders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114215
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Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666670
We argue that dividend stickiness, the tendency of managers to keep dividends unchanged, implies that managers use a partially pooling dividend policy. We offer a model that demonstrates how such a policy can evolve endogenously in equilibrium. An informed manager who cares about the firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752022
Consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m. This paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent. We present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049704
Traditional performance evaluation measures do not account for tail events and rare disasters. To address this issue, we reinterpret the riskiness measures of Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) as performance indices. We derive the moment properties of these indices and their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039244