We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms, but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms. A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) or corruption (moral...

In a model of horizontal matching on the labor market, we show that increasing workers’ bargaining power may increase some employers’ incentive to switch to new production activities. In particular, this could lead to (i) higher wages, (ii) more jobs, (iii) better jobs and (iv) higher...

This paper investigates Western professional bankers’ perceptions of Islamic finance. Exploiting data from an original survey, we carry out a principal component analysis (PCA) to characterize the main dimensions on which financial agents diverge. The PCA extracts five dimensions—accounting...

We study the choice of transportation modes within a city where commuters have heterogeneous preferences for a car. As in standard models of externalities, the market outcome never maximizes aggregate welfare. We show that in the presence of multiple equilibria problems of coordination can...

To meet its infrastructure needs, the Middle East needs to invest, on average, around 6% of its GDP annually, although with differences across countries. This could lead to direct job creation of about 2.5 million direct, indirect and induced infrastructure-related jobs. Because of significant...