In this paper we try to construct an hypothesis as to why, as data seem to show, countries that adopt more "transparent procurement", as calculated by the share of tender advertised publicly, are also the ones where corruption is considered more pervasive. We describe an economy where in...

pt. 1. Competitive dialogue and contractual design fostering innovation and needs analysis -- pt. 2. Separation of selection and award criteria, including exclusion of reputation indicators like references to experience, performance and CVs from award criteria -- pt. 3. Re-tendering a contract...

pt. 1. Supporting social considerations via public procurement -- pt. 2. Lots, the economic and legal challenges of centralized procurement -- pt. 3. Innovation through innovative partnerships -- pt. 4. Green public procurement.

Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The aim of this paper is to explain the role of such bonuses in an economic environment with corruption, i.e. in a world where entrepreneurs and tax inspectors are open to bribery. In detail, we...

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship...