We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people׳s willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this ‘crowding out’ phenomenon using standard economic arguments. The...

Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experiments. Most experiments in which bubbles occur feature a declining fundamental value. This feature has been criticized for being atypical of real financial markets. Here, we experimentally study other ingredients for bubble...

How can a manager influence workers' activity, while knowing little about it? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for...

A performance measure may or may not reflect the relative importance of different tasks for the production of benefit: it can be aligned or unaligned. Here, I examine when using an aligned measure generates a larger surplus in a principal-agent relationship than using an unaligned but otherwise...

This article shows how to construct a likelihood for a general class of censoring problems. This likelihood is proven to be valid, i.e. its maximizer is consistent and the respective root-n estimator is asymptotically efficient and normally distributed under regularity conditions. The method...

We investigate the costs and benefits of managerial interventions with a team in which workers care to different degrees about output. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions by the manager may have...