bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but … attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

Despite extensive use of bargaining models in economics and despite Becker's insistence on the importance of altruism … in families, the theoretical literature on bargaining ignores altruism and assumes that everyone is an egoist. This paper … shows that incorporating altruism into cooperative bargaining models shrinks the set potential cooperative bargaining …

approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant …

In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining experiment where … proposer. In additional treatments we investigate bargaining situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. …

We study a negotiation model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. When players have different … characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible …