We propose to mitigate child labor by encouraging temporary emigration. It emerges that the remittances sent by the emigrating parents might enable not only their children, but also others, to stop working even upon the return of the emigrant parents.

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with (<InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[$n \ge 2$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) and without (n=1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player...</equationsource></inlineequation>

Rich countries often face sizeable illegal migration. This paper suggests that these countries would use the financial aid which they give to the source countries as an instrument to prevent illegal immigration. The core of this policy is to allow the source countries to compete for the...

The social costs of rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation have been studied and evaluated independently. We show that, when rent seekers earn taxable income, there is interdependence between the two types of social losses. Rent seeking increases the excess burden of taxation under risk...

Membership in the authors' labor-managed firm is determined in the long run by expected income maximization. In the short run, upon the realization of output price, each member may leave the labor-managed firm. However, a decision to leave when the entire membership quits is associated with...