Purpose: Studies on corporate boards examine how social ties between the CEO and independent board members affect the effectiveness of board monitoring. Much evidence suggests that social connections between the CEO and independent directors are associated with inadequate monitoring and lower...

We posit that firms use dividend payout policy to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs caused by country-level institutional weaknesses. Firms operating in countries with weak insider trading laws attempt to mitigate this institutional weakness by committing themselves to paying out...

Our paper provides evidence regarding the use of share repurchases as an earnings management mechanism in the presence of debt-financing constraints as well as the impact of these constraints on the use of accruals and other real earnings management techniques. We document that share repurchases...

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to...

We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately...