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"Over the last few decades behavioral economics has revolutionized the discipline. It has done so by putting the human back into economics, by recognizing that people sometimes make mistakes, care about others and are generally not as cold and calculating as economists have traditionally...
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In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency...
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In a setting where agents must choose between two investments, Zhang (in RAND J Econ 28:188–205, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1997</CitationRef>) proposed an equilibrium in which there is strategic delay. This equilibrium relied upon there being an information cascade. We shall demonstrate that an information cascade need not generally...</citationref>
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We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in...
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Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000, etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether categorising raises more than simple uncategorised reporting. To answer these questions, we employ a signalling game...
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We argue that a social norm and the coordination of behavior within social groups can be expressed by a correlated equilibrium. Given a social group structure (a partition of individuals into social groups), we propose four conditions that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent...
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