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Although both economists and psychologists seek to identify determinants of heterogeneity in behavior, they use different concepts to capture them. In this review, we first analyze the extent to which economic preferences and psychological concepts of personality, such as the Big Five and locus...
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type="main" xml:id="obes12048-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Cross-section regressions often examine many candidate regressors. We use multiple testing procedures (MTPs) controlling the false discovery rate (FDR) — the expected ratio of false to all rejections — so as not to erroneously select variables...</p>
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Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime (weakly) decreases in deterrent incentives, that is, severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970317
Are people more likely to infringe on a legal obligation if they perceive it as unfair? This question is especially relevant in situations with low potential punishment for disobeying an obligation, i.e., with expressive law. To explore this issue, we present experimental evidence on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051362
Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime (weakly) decreases in deterrent incentives, that is, severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010581365
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our design allows analyzing the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil of ignorance subjects choose more equal distributions than in front of the veil, but only a minority acts according...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008869423