We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of...

A stationary variant of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which the game frontier is a parallelogram is analyzed. By using the probabilistic cheap talk concept of [3], the discount factor becomes fungible, and for a critical value of the discount factor a unique Pareto-optimal and...

type="main" <p>We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information...</p>

We revisit Kyle’s (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1985</CitationRef>) model of price formation in the presence of private information. We begin by using Back’s (Rev Financ Stud 5(3):387–409, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1992</CitationRef>) approach, demonstrating that if standard assumptions are imposed, the model has a unique equilibrium solution...</citationref></citationref>

A principal has a stochastically evolving target that he wishes an agent to repeatedly hit with his effort. The agent does not obtain utility from hitting the target and therefore attempts to shirk; the agent's utility is determined by a second process that symmetrically is of no use to the...

The author studies a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of consumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth, with realized marginal utility of wealth private information. He shows that currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that is...

I present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks. Complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry; income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them. Any insurance institution must...