Showing 1 - 10 of 3,017
This paper proposes a unified framework that integrates the traditional index-based approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests on a quantifiable notion of ex post power as the (counter-factual) sensitivity of the expected or observed outcome to individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011135404
This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114474
Since the introduction of the co-decision legislative procedure, the EU has had the possibility to resort to a Conciliation Committee made up of representatives from the European Parliament and the Council to reconcile differences between the two bodies. This article assesses whether the members...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010772685
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005680857
, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531019
The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263569
We introduce endogenous political parties into the Hotelling-Downs voting framework to model the selection of candidates. First, activists choose which party to join, if at all. Second, party members select a champion for the general election. Third, the electorate median voter determines the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084416
We develop several results related to equilibrium in sophisticated voting under an amendment agenda procedure and supermajoritarian voting rules. Contrary to the simple majority case, we demonstrate that attainable equilibria are a function of the location of the status quo ex ante as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010778033
This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes to date (1993–2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056265