Similar Search Results

Individual Protection Against Property Crime: Decomposing the Effects of Protection Observability

Hotte, Louis; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We revisit the question of the efficiency of individual decisions to be protected against crime for the cases of both …. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504304

Individual protection against property crime: decomposing the effects of protection observability

Hotte, Louis; Ypersele, Tanguy van - In: Canadian Journal of Economics 41 (2008) 2, pp. 537-563

We re-examine the efficiency of observable and unobservable crime protection decisions with new results and insights …. Observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality. At the individual level, it reduces the crime … on the crime effort exerted, though it deters crime globally. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111478

Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 166 (2010) 4, pp. 573-590

We analyze whether corporate leniency programs should grant full immunity to the first self-reporting firm regardless of the amount of evidence provided. We distinguish between two firms, one of them providing high and one only low evidence. We show that awarding full amnesty also to the low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727990

Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 162 (2006) 2, pp. 277-290

. After committing a crime, individuals get a private update of their probability of apprehension. Hence, self-enforcing has an option …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582066

Late Informed Betting and the Favourite-Longshot Bias

Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

According to the favorite-longshot bias observed in pari-mutuel betting, the final distribution of bets overestimates the winning chance of longshots. This Paper proposes an explanation of this bias based on late betting by small privately informed bettors. These bettors have an incentive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504377

Restricted Coasean bargaining

MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus - In: Journal of Public Economics 97 (2013) C, pp. 296-307

We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find that bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608543

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2005

This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law %u2013 the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014923

Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed to Domestic Violence Affect Everyone's Kids

Carrell, Scott E.; Hoekstra, Mark L. - In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (2010) 1, pp. 211-28

There is a widespread perception that externalities from troubled children are significant, though measuring them is difficult due to data and methodological limitations. We estimate the negative spillovers caused by children from troubled families by exploiting a unique dataset in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596299

Curbing coca cultivation in Colombia — A framed field experiment

Ibanez, Marcela; Martinsson, Peter - In: Journal of Public Economics 105 (2013) C, pp. 1-10

This paper investigates the efficiency of carrot and stick policies to reduce investment in coca cultivation in rural Colombia. To measure behavioral responses to anti-drug policies, we conducted a framed field experiment with farmers living in one of the most important coca growing areas. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056220

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2004

This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the optimal mix of sanctions, including the imprisonment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580013