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Summary It is often argued in economics that building a reputation for trustworthiness could help individuals or firms to mitigate or even overcome problems of contractual incompleteness. In this paper, we use data from the German eBay website to test whether a seller’s bad reputation has an...
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We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, selfish principals are not. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116892
We consider a dismissal tournament where the loser gets fired. Although the firm takes possible selection failures into account when choosing the optimal tournament design, the selection efficiency of a dismissal tournament is often rather low. This is because low-ability workers, possessing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010828369
We analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an agent. The supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent, but his preferences are private information. In a model with two supervisor types, we find that the optimal contract may be very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048095
We conduct a general analysis of the effects of inequality aversion on decisions by homogeneous players in static and dynamic games. We distinguish between direct and indirect effects of inequality aversion. Direct effects are present when a player changes his action to affect disutility caused...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048142
Players often engage in high-profile public communications to demonstrate their confidence in winning before they carry out actual competitive activities. We investigate players’ incentives to engage in such pre-contest communication. Our key assumption is that a player suffers a cost when he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048145
We consider a dynamic tournament where contestants choose a productive effort and to help or sabotage their opponents. Sabotage lowers the output of the victim. Moreover, sabotage imposes an additional direct psychic cost on the victim. Because the current leader is sabotaged most strongly in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065137