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Teams versus individuals in pre-play cheap talk communication

Yang, Huanxing; Ye, Zexin; Zhang, Lan - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 114 (2025), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015190643

On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe

Crettez, Bertrand; Deloche, Régis - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 87 (2013) C, pp. 66-72

Numerous papers show how game theory can improve our understanding of literature. There is no paper, however, using experimental economics to arrive at a new understanding of a play. We fill this gap by using experimental evidence to compare the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636229

When Does Coordination Require Centralization?

Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate … for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. As a result, no matter how … important coordination is, decentralization dominates centralization if the division managers are not too biased towards their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124372

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083306

Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Directed search models are market games in which each firm announces a wage commitment to attract a worker. Miscoordination among workers generates search frictions, yet in equilibrium more productive firms post more attractive wage commitments to fill their vacancies faster, which yields...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083578

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 24-44

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738052

Expert advice for amateurs

Lai, Ernest K. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 103 (2014) C, pp. 1-16

A biased, perfectly informed expert advises a partially and privately informed decision maker using cheap-talk message. The decision maker can tell whether the state is “high” or “low” relative to a private threshold that divides the unit-interval state space into two subintervals. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048083

Voronoi languages

Jäger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 517-537

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703

Communication in Cournot oligopoly

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 152-176

This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk, and show that when these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930788