James M. Buchanan’s contributions to public finance and political economy are surveyed in six areas: (1) debt, fiscal illusion, and Keynesian criticisms; (2) London School of Economics cost approach; (3) methodological individualism and the economics of politics; (4) welfare price theory;...

This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent-seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent-seeking activities are price-inelastic, a...

In the authors' political equilibrium model, regulation is considered an implicit and regressive tax-equivalent alternative to the common and less regressive fiscal alternatives: income, property, and sales taxes. The authors hypothesize that in more heterogeneous jurisdictions the state relies...

We introduce a computational model of the evolution of a value-maximizing research-based pharmaceutical firm and parameterize it using estimates of R&D costs, profit distributions, and candidate attrition rates. We use the model to estimate how the probability of surviving and covering the costs...

Nations differ in their tolerance for costs of fighting and in their willingness to make concessions. We use a bargaining model of war to analyze these sensitivities. Incentives created by heightened sensitivity to costs often—but not always—contradict those created by heightened...

Thomas E Borcherding passed away on February 12, 2014, of congestive heart failure. He was 74. He is survived by his wife, Rhoda, and his sons Matthew and Benjamin. He made important, lasting contributions to the discipline of economics, particularly to the fields of public choice and law and...