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evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … her evaluation. For good performance, however, the principal pays a constant high wage without justification. Furthermore …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private …
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This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts … receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while rational receivers benefit from disclosure. The results hold …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420613
I present a model in which a principal selects one among many agents to develop a project and influences the agent's ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project's mission. The closer the project's mission to the agent's preferred mission, the...
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This paper analyzes the impact of agents' risk aversion and other agency parameters on optimal bias in the performance measures used for incentive contracts. Prior research has shown that the limited liability of the agent results in a demand for accounting systems that are stringent compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544458
Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635663
In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...
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