We offer an evolutionary model of the emergence of concepts of salience through similarity-based learning. When an individual faces a new decision problem, she chooses an action that she perceives as similar to actions that, when chosen in similar previous problems, led to favourable outcomes....

Many experiments investigating different decision theories have relied heavily on pairwise choices between lotteries. These are easy to incentivise, but often yield only limited dichotomous information. This paper considers whether respondents’ judgments about their strength of preference...

We present the results of an experiment measuring the impact of low group status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrimination. Subjects interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets where they can trade group membership. Low status and...

We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels ("cues") can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have payoff-irrelevant spatial locations....

We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable...

Like avoiding labor protection laws via foreign subcontractors, banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who, similar to properly incentivized subcontractors, can gain by deceiving those in the role of proper...