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We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594322
One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting … weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822445
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454
We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game …. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011209594
There is an ongoing discussion about the relationship of power and preferences: Is power reflected in what the agents can do and what they want to do, or, alternatively, are preferences and power two separate dimensions of determining the outcome of decisionmaking? In the latter case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027154
paper adopts an underlying legislative bargaining model proposed by Volden and Wiseman (2007) in which legislators with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608565
We study the volunteer's dilemma in environments with heterogeneous preferences and private information. We characterize the efficiency properties of equilibrium, which is a departure from all the previous literature that focuses only on the probability of group success. While the probability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015072940
This paper studies the strategic role of extremism within a two-country multi-stage game and shows that, in general, an equilibrium exists in which extremism is used by both rivals. We show that often changes in the environment affect the two countries differently. Specifically, as a country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556680
I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189762