We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete … admissions model where both schools and students are strategic agents, the school placement model where only students are … strategic agents and they induce an endogenous priority structure of schools over students, and finally the school choice model …

admissions system where students submit brief preference lists. Although option value should encourage riskier top choices, many … students are overly cautious and fail to include safer lower-ranked options. We argue that directed cognition--making myopic … decisions while ignoring the value of subsequent options--explains this behavior. An in-field experiment targeting a key framing …

centralized assignment mechanism. Leveraging unique administrative data and an information experiment, we show that students and … participants in a two-sided matching market. We consider the market for medical school programs in Denmark, which uses a … rival programs hold payoff-relevant information that each program could use to admit students with higher persistence rates …