1. Introduction -- 2. Game theoretic models of fishing -- 3. Cooperative and non-cooperative management when capital investment is malleable -- 4. Cooperative and non-cooperative management when capital investment is non-malleable -- 5. Strategic dynamic interaction : the case of Barents Sea...

While the recurrent cost of managing marine protected areas (MPAs) has been documented and estimated, there has been virtually no attempt to quantify the cost of establishing MPAs in the first place. This lack of attention is likely the result of the complexity of the process, involving often...

First, we study the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic biomodel with cooperative game...

An Introduction to the special issue on Recent Developments in Fisheries Economics

We study the distributional and efficiency effects of marine protected areas using the Northeast Atlantic cod stock as an example. A model with two players targeting different age groups of cod is developed to examine how protected areas may affect payoffs to the players under cooperation and...