Arguments about the appropriate discount rate often start by assuming a Utilitarian social welfare function with isoelastic utility, in which the consumption discount rate is a function of the (constant) elasticity of marginal utility along with the (much discussed) utility discount rate. In...

The empirical evidence on the existence of social preferences-or lack thereof-is predominantly based on student samples. Yet, knowledge about whether these findings can be extended to the general population is still scarce. In this paper, we compare the distribution of social preferences in a...

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

This paper discusses recent neuroeconomic evidence related to other-regarding behaviours and the decision to trust in other people’s other-regarding behaviour. This evidence supports the view that people derive non-pecuniary utility (i) from mutual cooperation in social dilemma (SD) games and...

The most fundamental solution concepts in Game Theory – Nash equilibrium, backward induction, and iterated elimination of dominated strategies – are based on the assumption that people are capable of predicting others' actions. These concepts require people to be able to view the game from...

The demonstrated capacity of markets to aggregate information motivates research on alternative institutions designed to do the same task. This study inquires about forms of parimutuel betting systems. Measures of information aggregation for performance evaluation are introduced. Two...

This paper describes the results of a web-based multi-period insurance purchasing experiment focusing on how individuals make insurance choices for low-probability, high-consequence events. Participants were told the probability and resulting losses of a hurricane occurring and were informed...