We study a dynamic agency problem with two-sided moral hazard: the worker chooses whether to exert effort or shirk; the manager chooses whether to invest in an attention technology to recognize worker performance. In equilibrium the worker uses past recognition to infer managerial attention. An...

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time-inconsistent preferences with a present-bias towards public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend...

type="main" <p>A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable,...</p>

Financial crises affect income distribution via different channels. We argue that financial transfers is an important channel, which has been overlooked by the literature. By analyzing data from the Mexican (1994-1995) and Argentine (2001-2002) crises, we investigate two types of financial...