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Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal,...
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When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for fair representation of all...
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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part I. Social Choice -- Chapter 2. Building Bridges over the Great Divide -- Chapter 3. Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures -- Chapter 4. Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences -- Chapter 5. Strategic Voting and...
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Classical power index analysis considers the individual's ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either "yes" or "no". Here we generalize three...
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